In the mind it is a composite made up of parts, just as, when the tongue utters it, the total speech is a compound of elements; and when the term is written, the written form is likewise composed of parts. A thing, then, possesses a reality in and of itself, is afterward conceived in the mind, then expressed by the tongue, and finally inscribed by the pen. It therefore enjoys four modes of being: in external reality, in thought, in speech, and in script—an actual existence, a cognitive existence, a verbal existence, and a written existence. Yet the existence that truly merits the name of “real existence” is the external one, like the human being who exists outside the mind.

This human being is described as living and as rational; yet these attributes are not antecedent to him—neither outwardly nor in thought—nor are they constituents from which he is assembled. Rather, he is characterized by them exactly as he is characterized by all his other necessary attributes. This is the view adopted by the Muslim dialecticians and by most rational thinkers: all indispensable attributes of a subject stand on an equal footing in this regard.

As for subdividing those attributes into (i) essential qualities that lie within the very reality of the thing and (ii) accidental but necessary qualities that lie outside it—and then further subdividing the necessary into what is necessary for the essence and what is necessary for its existence—such is the doctrine of the logicians. The majority of Muslim schools of speculative thought, and others as well, have dissented from this, as their writings make clear.

The earliest person I know who sided with them on this point is Abū Hāmid, in some of his works, and people reproached him for it—just as they criticized him for agreeing with them on certain matters of theology and prophetology—even though Abū Hāmid himself rebuked them for other errors in matters of divinity. These issues are detailed elsewhere.

What matters here is that to affirm an eternal, pre-existent being whose existence is possible and whose non-existence is likewise possible is a claim