As for positing an eternal yet contingent being, this appears in the writings of Ibn Sīnā and those who followed his path—such as Suhrawardī, al-Rāzī, and al-Āmidī. A number of his fellow philosophers, including Ibn Rushd the grandson and others, rejected this view, declaring that by it he departed both from the doctrine of the ancient masters and from plain reason itself.

Consequently, these thinkers were beset with objections concerning possibility that they could not answer—as we have shown in our commentary on the Muḥaṣṣal and elsewhere—for they posited what necessarily combines two contradictories: the supposition of an eternal, everlasting essence whose non-existence is utterly impossible.

Yet they still said, “It is necessary through something else,” while maintaining that, considered in itself, this essence is equally disposed to existence and non-existence, with neither being more fitting for it than the other. They went further, asserting that its existence or non-existence occurs only by an external cause, and that the cause of its non-existence is the absence of the efficient cause.

The majority of rational people replied, “This is invalid on two grounds. First, that…"