Al-Ṣafadiyyah - Ibn Taimiya - (2/132)

In that case the temporal occurrence would have to be a cause for the Eternal. Yet even were it itself dependent—like a conditioned entity that needs its condition—it remains indisputable that the originated depends on the Eternal; if the Eternal were likewise to depend on it, each of the two would stand in mutual dependence upon the other.

Such mutual conditioning is conceivable only when both are effects of a single cause and both are originated, as in the relationship of fatherhood and sonship; or when both are eternal and inseparable, with no cause between them, as with Essence and attributes. But if one of the pair is eternal in itself and the other is originated in its particulars, the existence of the Eternal would then be made contingent upon things that have not yet come into being, so that the condition would be posterior to what it is supposed to condition.

Should someone say, “The conditioned thing is the species as such, which accompanies the individual,” we respond that a species exists only gradually, piece by piece. At every moment a newly originated instance is linked to the Eternal; that particular originated entity would therefore become a condition for the Eternal, which could not exist apart from it—just as neither member of two correlated originated entities exists without the other, and the Eternal Essence never exists without the eternal attribute. The Eternal is intrinsic to the Essence, whereas every temporal occurrence is accidental, not intrinsic, even though the species in abstraction is said to be concomitant.

At most one might claim that the Essence necessitates both the inseparable particular that is everlasting and the temporally originated individuals of the species. This would resemble the rapport of one attribute with another: one would then say that the necessary component cannot exist apart from the Essence, and once it subsists in the Essence it falls within the very designation of that Essence and becomes part of it. Indeed, the names of God Most High encompass His attributes; any inseparable attribute that subsists in His Essence is accordingly included within His Name.

Consequently, if that necessary component itself is made contingent upon acts that He brings into being one after another, then what is

الحادث علة للقديم وإن كانت مفتقرة افتقار المشروط إلى شرطه فلا ريب أن المحدث مشروط بالقديم فإذا كان القديم مشروطا به كان كل من الأمرين مشروطا بالآخر. وهذا ممكن فما كان معلولي علة واحدة وهما حادثان كالأبوة والبنوة أو ما كانا قديمين متلازمين لا علة لهما كالذات والصفات أما إذا كان أحدهما قديم العين والآخر حادث الأعيان كان وجود القديم مشروطا بأمور لم توجد بعد وكان الشرط متأخرا عن المشروط. وإن قيل: المشروط هو النوع وهو ملازم للعين لكن النوع لا يوجد إلا شيئا فشيئا فلا وقت من الأوقات إلا والمقرون بالقديم واحد محدث فيكون ذلك المحدث شرطا في وجود ذلك القديم لا يوجد إلا مع وجوده كما لا يوجد أحد المحدثين إلا مع الآخر ولا الذات القديمة إلا مع الصفة القديمة والقديم لازم للذات وكل من الحوادث ليس بلازم بل عارض وإن كان النوع لازما. أقصى ما يقال: إن الذات هي الموجبة للمعين اللازم وللنوع الحادث أعيانه فيشبه ذلك أحد الصفتين مع الأخرى فيقال الأمر اللازم لا وجود للذات بدونه وإذا كان قائما بالذات فقد دخل في مسماها وصار منها فإن أسماء الله تعالى متناولة لصفاته فما قام بذاته من الصفات اللازمة فهو داخل في اسمه تعالى. فإذا كان ذلك مشروطا بأفعال يحدثها شيئا بعد شيء صار ما هو