a contingent event. Hence nothing whatsoever in the universe could have existed from all eternity: its existence in pre-eternity is impossible both without the contingent event and together with it.

Nor may one argue that the successive contingencies attached to the universe—such as the movements of the celestial sphere—are analogous to the Lord’s consecutive words and acts. The Lord is the One who exists by Himself, necessarily existent by Himself, self-sufficient by Himself, self-subsisting by Himself; His speech and action do not depend on anything outside Him. Nor is there any impossibility in His second act or second word being conditioned upon the prior existence of the first, for whatever is, by its very nature, produced bit by bit cannot, in its totality, be eternal. Everything other than He is an effected, fashioned thing, dependent in every respect on something beyond itself. If, then, contingent events accompany such a being one after another, they cannot issue from an eternal, fully sufficient cause, and it is likewise impossible for an eternal, fully sufficient cause to bring things about successively; rather, its effect would have to accompany it from the outset. It is also impossible for an eternal, fully sufficient cause to be necessitating by its essence in pre-eternity yet responsible for successive contingencies, for the emergence of continual events from a fully sufficient cause that remains in a single, unchanging state is inconceivable. Were that allowable, a capable, voluntarily choosing agent could bestow preference without a determinant, and their proof would collapse.

If, on the contrary, contingencies arise because certain occurrences proceed from Him—so that His essence is a fully sufficient cause for the very essence of the celestial sphere in pre-eternity and His successive acts necessitate its successive contingencies—then He has never been save in conjunction with successive acts subsisting in Him. Yet the occurrence of an effect without an act is impossible, and the pre-eternity of a particular act is likewise impossible, for an act, by definition, entails sequence, one thing after another; it is unintelligible to posit a specific act as pre-eternal.

This is an independent proof that everything other than God is originated, for the effect