Moreover, the term “self-necessitating cause” can be taken in two senses. In one sense it denotes a being whose bare essence, stripped of all attributes and actions, necessarily entails its effect; on this understanding a distinction is drawn between what is called a self-necessitating cause and what is called an agent who acts by choice. In another sense it refers to a being who brings about its effect by virtue of an essence endowed with attributes, will, and action; in that case, being a self-necessitating cause does not conflict with being a voluntary agent.

Their contention, therefore, that preferring one possibility without a complete determinant is impossible for a self-necessitating cause but permissible for a voluntary agent, is untenable. For the voluntary agent still acts by choice, yet once perfect power and decisive will are present the act must necessarily occur; he thus becomes a self-necessitating cause by virtue of an essence characterized by power and will, not by an essence bereft of them.

The most that can be said in defense of their contradiction is this: the Eternal Being who chooses may prefer one of His two possibles without a determinant, whereas a contingent choosing agent may not. Nothing, they say, can arise from the contingent agent except through something other than himself, because his very capability, will, and agency are bestowed upon him from outside. His essence does not of itself entail capability, volition, and action; these are conferred upon him, and therefore he cannot prefer without a determinant. Whenever he needs such a determinant, it is produced by God Most High. The Eternal Necessary Being—glorified and exalted is He—differs in that He is the originator of everything besides Himself and is, in His own being, independent of all else; hence He can prefer one side of a possibility without any determinant.

To such people we reply: this distinction is unsound for several reasons.