That position is closer to the religion brought by the Messengers, for it permits one to maintain that everything other than God, exalted and glorified be He, is created and originated; the most it entails is that successive acts must inhere in the Necessary Being Himself. This, in fact, is the view of the leading Imams of the ḥadīth scholars and the majority of them, of several schools among the theologians, and of the chief sages of the ancient philosophers. Thus it is upheld alike by the foremost authorities of the religious communities and by the principal philosophers. In short, it is an issue disputed among the adherents of revealed religions, yet one may hold it while remaining in harmony with the prophets—unlike the view he advanced.

Moreover, al-Rāzī and al-Āmidī have both pointed out the weakness of the proofs offered by those who deny this, and al-Rāzī noted that the point in question follows necessarily for virtually all schools. He then tried to establish it by an argument that is itself exceedingly weak, as has been set out elsewhere in detail. In light of this, the answer that is sounder in both revelation and reason deserves preference over the answer that is more corrupt in both revelation and reason. So much for al-Ārmawī’s reply.

As for al-Rāzī’s own response and the dilemma he posed for them, it is correct as he stated, but he did not formulate and elucidate it in a way that fully satisfies; hence al-Ārmawī did not grasp its true purport. The point is this: if the fully sufficient cause is eternal, the perpetuity of its effects necessarily follows, and consequently nothing would ever come into being—something that contradicts plain sense-perception. This argument alone suffices once it is properly conceived, for if it is said that the fully sufficient cause is eternal and that its effects follow from it necessarily, the coming-to-be of any effect becomes impossible. It would follow that nothing comes into existence at all, because events arising without a cause are impossible, and their arising from an eternal fully sufficient cause is likewise impossible. As for the objection he raised, it can be met by what has already been stated, and by other replies as well.