Al-Ṣafadiyyah - Ibn Taimiya - (2/52)

rather than being merely concomitant with Him. In fact, such a concomitant could not truly be called His effect, for whatever is inseparable from a thing and does not come into renewed existence falls under the heading of its essential attributes, not its actions. What is inseparable from a thing and neither arises nor renews is not brought about by its power and choice; it is simply one of the necessary concomitants of its essence. And whatever belongs to the necessary concomitants of the essence neither renews nor originates; it is included in the very notion of that essence, like its essential attributes. Hence it is neither an act of His nor one of His effects.

Given this, to conceive of a Being who is necessary in Himself, eternal, self-subsisting, and free of all need—yet who does nothing, brings nothing into existence, and is incapable of doing so—is to strip Him of the attributes of perfection. The possibility of acting successively, producing one thing after another, is a genuine possibility in reality, as it is observed in created beings; therefore it is a possible perfection that carries no defect. Indeed, they themselves concede that generosity is a perfection. Consequently, a Necessary Being who neither acts, nor bestows, nor brings anything into existence is more deficient than one who acts, bestows, and continually originates things. And since this is a perfection free of any imperfection and possible in existence, it follows that it must belong to the Necessary Existent, to the Eternal, to the One free of all need, and to the Self-Subsisting.

If this is so, then for one possessed of this attribute it is impossible that any effect should coexist with Him; were an effect to be co-eternal with Him, the very perfection—namely, originating things successively and acting continually upon effects one after another—would be negated. Now, because this perfection, which He deserves by virtue of His very essence, necessitates that He bring things into being successively, it is impossible that anything accompany Him

إلا مقارنا له بل يقال هذا في الحقيقة ليس مفعولا له إذ ما كان لازما للشيء لا يتجدد فهو من باب صفاته اللازمة له لا من باب أفعاله فإن ما لزم الشيء ولم يحدث ويتجدد لم يكن حاصلا بقدرته واختياره بل كان من لوازم ذاته وما كان من لوازم ذاته لا يتجدد ولا يحدث كان داخلا في مسمى ذاته كصفاته اللازمة له فلم يكن ذلك من أفعاله ولا من مفعولاته. وإذا كان كذلك فتقدير واجب بنفسه أو قديم أو قيوم أو غني لا يفعل شيئا ولا يحدثه ولا يقدر على ذلك تقدير مسلوب لصفات الكمال وكون الفعل ممكنا شيئا بعد شيء أمر ممكن في الوجود كما هو موجود للمخلوقات فثبت أنه كمال ممكن ولا نقص فيه لا سيما وهم يسلمون أن الجود صفة كمال فواجب لا يفعل ولا يجود ولا يحدث شيئا أنقص ممن يفعل ويجود ويحدث شيئا بعد شيء وإذا كان كمالا لا نقص فيه وهو ممكن الوجود لزم أن يكون ثابتا لواجب الوجود وأن يكون ثابتا للقديم وأن يكون ثابتا للغنى عما سواه وأن يكون ثابتا للقيوم. وإذا كان كذلك فمن كانت هذه صفته امتنع وجود المفعول معه لأنه لو وجد معه للزم سلب الكمال وهو الإحداث شيئا بعد شيء والفعل الدائم للمفعولات شيئا بعد شيء وإذا كان نفس الكمال الذي يستحقه لذاته يوجب أن يفعل شيئا بعد شيء ويمتنع أن يقارنه