If someone were to say, “His act is eternal in kind, while its particular instances are originated,” it would follow that everything other than Him is originated and that nothing alongside Him could be eternal. None of His effects could be everlasting, for every effect entails temporal events. Such a claim would necessitate the occurrence of events without a cause and the preference of one of two identical alternatives without a differentiating factor. For nothing can be eternal unless it proceeds from an act that is itself eternal in concrete instance, not merely eternal in kind; yet an act that is eternal in its very instance and nonetheless produces a temporal effect is impossible, and so too is an eternal act that produces what merely accompanies that effect. Two co-eternal acts—one for the event itself and another for its concomitant—are likewise impossible. Hence the pre-eternity of any act producing a part of the world is impossible under every consideration, because the existence of an effect without the act on which it depends is impossible.

It has also been shown that for the world to subsist free of events and then for events to arise within it is impossible; therefore its pre-eternity is impossible in every respect.

One may, furthermore, conceive of the origination of the entire world by considering solely the Agent who brings it into being, without regard to the world itself—contrary to what Ibn al-Khaṭīb and a group maintain when they claim that those who affirm pre-eternity look only to the Cause, whereas those who affirm origination look only to the effect.

The matter is this: it has been firmly established that He is characterized by attributes of perfection, and that every perfection whose existence is possible necessarily belongs to Him and is inseparable from Him.

Accordingly, we say: an Agent who is capable of acting successively, bringing events into existence one after another, is more perfect than one who cannot originate at all; indeed, the latter’s effect would not even