Abū ʿAlī and Abū Hāshim al-Jubbāʾī, Abū al-Ḥusayn al-Baṣrī, Muḥammad ibn Karrām, Ibn al-Hayṣam, Hishām ibn al-Ḥakam, and others have all stated plainly that affirming the existence of such things is, by the very necessity of reason, manifestly untenable; likewise, to posit something that can neither be pointed to nor subsists in something that can be pointed to is, by the same rational necessity, known to be false—absolutely so according to one group, and with respect only to contingent beings according to another. This has been set out in detail in its proper place. Had al-Ārmawī applied this reasoning to the Necessary Existent Himself, it would have