Al-ṢafadiyyahIbn Taimiya

be affirmed of the other; whatever is obligatory for one would be obligatory for the other, and whatever is impossible for one would likewise be impossible for the other. If it were permissible for anything whatsoever to resemble Him in any respect, it would necessarily follow that whatever is possible for that thing would be possible for Him, that whatever is incumbent upon it would be incumbent upon Him, and that whatever is impossible for it would be impossible for Him.

Yet the Lord—exalted is He—must be characterized by necessary existence, pre-eternity, and everlastingness, and it is impossible for Him to be originated, to cease to exist, or to be merely possible. Were any of the contingent, originated beings to resemble Him, one would have to affirm pre-eternity for the originated and necessity for the contingent, while at the same time affirming origination and contingency for the Necessary, the Pre-eternal. That would entail combining mutually exclusive opposites in several respects.

Someone might object: “The Necessary Being and the contingent being still agree in the bare notion of existence and self-subsistence, and both are living, knowing, and powerful; therefore, whatever can apply to one should be able to apply to the other.”

We reply: They do not truly resemble one another in that point of agreement, nor are they equal therein. What is affirmed for God in those attributes is in no way comparable to what is affirmed for the creature; indeed, the disparity between them is greater than the disparity between the greatest of created beings and the least of them.

If it is said that they “share” those attributes, the meaning is only that they share in an abstract universal—a pure concept that exists solely in the mind, not in external reality. Otherwise, what each of them possesses is unique to him; none shares it with him. Moreover, that universal notion is not itself subject to any attribute of deficiency, so whatever is necessary, permissible, or impossible with respect to that concept presents no problem in attributing it to the Lord.

Accordingly, the mere designation of something as existent, self-subsistent, living, knowing, powerful, hearing, and seeing—though one may call this a shared description—carries no implication of imperfection. Whatever that common notion entails, permits, or precludes, the Lord is rightly and perfectly described thereby.

على الآخر ويجب له ما يجب له ويمتنع عليه ما يمتنع عليه فلو جاز مماثلة شيء من الأشياء له في شيء من الأشياء للزم أني جوز عليه ما يجوز عليه ويجب له ما يجب له ويمتنع عليه. ما يمتنع عليه وهو سبحانه يجب له الوجود والقدم والبقاء ويمتنع عليه الحدوث والعدم والإمكان فلو ماثله شيء من المحدثات الممكنات للزم أن يجب للمحدث القدم وللممكن الوجوب وأن يجب للواجب القديم الحدوث والإمكان وذلك يستلزم الجمع بين النقيضين من وجوه متعددة. فإن قيل فالواجب والممكن يتفقان في مسمى الوجود والقيام بالنفس وأن كلا منهما حي عليم قدير فيلزم أن يجوز على أحدهما ما جاز على الآخر. قيل: هما لم يتماثلا في هذا الذي اتفقا فيه ولم يتساويا في ذلك بل الثابت لله من ذلك ليس مماثلا للثابت للمخلوق من ذلك بل بينهما من التفاضل أعظم من التفاضل الذي بين أعظم المخلوقات وأدناها. وإذا قيل: اشتركا في ذلك فمعناه أنهما اشتركا في الكلي المطلق الذي لا يوجد كليا مطلقا إلا في الذهن لا في الخارج وإلا فما لكل منهما من ذلك يختص به لا يشركه فيه غيره ثم ذلك المشترك لا يلزمه شيء من صفات النقص وما وجب له وجاز عليه وامتنع عليه فلا محذور في اتصاف الرب به فمسمى كون الشيء موجودا قائما بنفسه حيا عليما قديرا سميعا بصيرا وإن قيل إنه متفق مشترك فما لزم هذا المشترك ووجب له وجاز عليه أو امتنع عليه فالرب موصوف به

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