Accordingly, there is no real difference between saying that the eternal being is a soul and saying that it is a body. Moreover, the reply is invalid for another reason: among the philosophers who affirm the existence of souls, the soul never parts from the body; rather, it must, in their view, remain attached to the body as its governor and disposer. They have disputed the nature of the celestial soul—whether it is a substance or an accident. Most hold it to be an accident, whereas Ibn Sīnā and a group of others preferred the view that it is a substance. If, then, the existence of the soul in which successive conceptions arise is contingent upon the existence of a body, this answer collapses.

As for the intellects, these are separate entities that do not manage bodies, and no events—whether successive or otherwise—occur within them according to the philosophers.

This answer also contains two further implications: first, it allows for events without a first beginning, on the assumption that the forbidden infinite regress concerns efficient causes, not effects and conditions—an abstract question that does not conflict with the foundations of Islam. Second, it affirms that the intellects and souls are pre-eternal, and that only bodies—not the intellects or souls—are created and originated. Such a claim belongs to none of the divinely revealed religions. It rests on the philosophers’ affirmation of separate intellects and souls and on their assertion that these are not bodies—a discourse that is, from a rational standpoint, thoroughly unsound, as has been demonstrated elsewhere.