And if you contend that the word in question is merely a verbal homonym, with absolutely no resemblance between the two meanings, then—should that contention be sound—your opponents could advance precisely the same answer; and if it is unsound, it will be of no benefit to you.

Third reply: Let us suppose that the two things named do in fact share a certain common element—the general, universal meaning on which they meet. This universal meaning, however, exists as universal only in the mind, not in external reality. Yet whatever necessarily follows from that general meaning must likewise follow for any being described by it, and there is no impropriety in this; indeed, it is correct.

Thus, when we say that the Creator is existent and the creature is existent, or that one is self-subsistent and the other is self-subsistent, or that both are living, all-knowing, and merciful, the abstract, universal point of agreement is simply the notion of existence, self-subsistence, life, knowledge, and mercy—or, put differently, the notion of being existent, self-subsistent, living, knowing, and merciful.

Nothing entailed by this general concept is something that must be denied of God; rather, all its entailments are attributes of perfection rightly ascribed to Him. It gives rise to any attribute of deficiency only when it is restricted to the servant, such as in the phrases “the servant’s existence,” “the servant’s knowledge,” or “the servant’s mercy.” Deficiency becomes attached to it when it is so limited and particularized, whereas God is exalted above everything peculiar to the servant. If, however, the Lord is characterized by the term, or if the term is taken in absolute, unqualified fashion without being tied to the servant, then in either of those two cases no imperfection attaches to it whatsoever. It is therefore clear that affirming this mutually acknowledged general element is entirely unobjectionable.