—each of those conceptions being preceded by another, with no first in the series. On that account, change took place in this sensible world. He went on to say:

Our reply is this: when a particular accident arises in the world, its coming-into-being must either depend on a cause or not. If it does not, then a contingent entity has occurred without a cause—something everyone agrees is impossible. If it does require a cause, then that cause is either itself originated or eternal. Should the cause be originated, the same question arises about how it began, and we are driven to posit an infinite set of causes and effects springing into existence all at once—an absurdity. Should the cause be eternal, you have ascribed a temporal effect to an eternal Agent; and once that is deemed conceivable, why should it not be conceivable for the whole universe to be so related to Him?

Al-Ārmūwī objected to this answer, saying: One might argue, “If by ‘cause’ you mean the complete cause, then its origination indicates only the origination of the complete causal nexus or of some of its conditions, not necessarily the origination of the efficient cause. But if by ‘cause’ you mean the efficient cause, the coming-into-being of the particular accident does not entail that the efficient cause itself has begun to exist; it indicates only that either it has begun…"