Such a conception entails non-existence in and of itself, whereas the other entails non-existence only through our knowledge that it is impossible; and every impossible thing is nonexistent, so the latter is even more manifestly characterized by non-existence. Our awareness of its non-existence bars it from being existent, yet it is no less impossible for it to be nonexistent than it is for it to be existent, for it is restricted by the negation of both predicates.

Non-existence can in fact have an external correlate, as when a human being is ‘not a horse’; but something that hovers between both existence and non-existence has no reality outside the mind. Consequently, to say that every existent is bound by the negation of all realities is to unite two contradictories. This corresponds to the position of those who claim that the Lord can be described only by negative attributes, while the other position resembles the claim of those who say that the Lord is to be described by neither negation nor affirmation.

The first part ends here—praise be to God. The second part will follow, God willing, and begins: “This second view is upheld by the extremist Qarmaṭī Bāṭinīs …”