a species, a proprium, or a common accident is considered from three angles: the natural, the logical, and the intellectual.
- The natural aspect is the unconditioned absolute (lā bi-sharṭ), in which the essence is not restricted by any positive or negative qualification.
- The Platonists, advocates of the doctrine of Forms, claim that such universals subsist in the external world—perpetual and eternal—independently of their particulars. Aristotle and his followers deny this, maintaining that a universal exists only together with its concrete instances. The truth is that it has no existence outside the mind apart from the existence of particulars themselves.
Whoever says that the absolute is a constituent part of the particular—such as one who asserts, “Man in general is a component of this man,” thereby positing an external composition of the absolute and the particular—has erred. If, however, he merely intends that “this particular man” who exists outside the mind is the very same entity that had been universal within the intellect, then that is correct.
Our expression “this man” is like saying “the learned man” or “the rational animal”: it attributes to the concrete individual two qualities, namely that he is an animal and that he is rational. Life and rationality inhere in him; they are not two separate parts out of which he is externally composed. Likewise, saying “this man” signifies that the individual is characterized both by the demonstrative reference and by humanity itself—a point explained elsewhere.
Accordingly, this is what they call the “natural universal.” The logical consideration lies in the fact that this universal is predicated of many and is characterized by generality. The intellectual consideration is the composite notion that results from the two: “man” qualified by the condition of being universal. By unanimous agreement—save for what is reported from the Platonists—this exists only in the mind. Further, this “man” qualified by universality does not encompass particular individuals, for they are not themselves universal; it is therefore incorrect to say that Zayd or ʿAmr is a “universal man.”