The absolute that is stripped of both affirmation and negation is, in certain respects, an even more extreme form of nullification than the view of Ibn Sīnā. What they posit cannot possibly be either existent or non-existent, for they have eliminated the two contradictories from every side. Ibn Sīnā, by contrast, combines the two contradictories in some respects; yet abolishing both contradictories in every respect is plainly a stronger act of negation than abolishing them only in part. Still, Ibn Sīnā’s formulation is more radical in another way: the privative conditions by which he restricts the matter are exceedingly numerous, while on the positive side he affirms nothing but a bare existence devoid of any real content.

This is the doctrine of the Bāṭinīs, such as Abū Yaʿqūb Isḥāq ibn Aḥmad al-Sijistānī, author of Al-Aqālīd al-Malakūtiyya, Al-Iftikhār, and the like, for they deny of Him both affirmation and negation. Its falsity is self-evident, as has already been shown.

Their claim that existence alone should be exempted from absolute predicates is, in fact, the very opposite of what is sound, for absolute existence encompasses everything. It is broader with respect to existent things than any other general term, just like the names “thing,” “existent,” “truth,” “reality,” “quiddity,” “essence,” and the like. These are the most universal of universals and the widest of absolutes. Accordingly, whenever a person allows that this absolute