If, then, all that is indispensable for efficacious causation was already present from pre-eternity, while we had assumed that it only came to be thereafter, the result is a contradiction. Should the second alternative be adopted, it would amount to preferring one of two equally possible contingents over the other with no determinant at all—an impossibility.

This, then, is the case when we say that everything required for causal efficacy existed from pre-eternity. But if we posit that none of those prerequisites existed in pre-eternity, their coming into being everlastingly after having been nonexistent must either require a cause or not. If no cause is needed, a contingent has arisen without a determinant; if a cause is needed, the discussion simply shifts to how that cause itself was produced, which entails an infinite regress—also impossible.

Al-Rāzī states, “This is the principal pillar of their argument.” He then relates the replies given by various theologians: some said the determinant is the Divine Will, others that it is Divine Knowledge; some maintained that the determinant lies in God’s covert judgment specifying the moment of origination; and still others argued that originating the world in pre-eternity is impossible, for origination means bringing a thing into existence after non-existence, which presupposes the precedence of non-existence, whereas pre-eternity negates being preceded by anything else. Combining the two, therefore, is impossible.