For this reason, we were once sitting in a gathering when the question arose, and I said, “No sect of the Muslims has ever asserted this; and even if someone has mentioned it, what he has cited offers no proof for declaring it false.” One of those who came to al-Rāzī’s defense said, “The Karrāmiyyah are the ones who said it.” I replied, “Neither a Karrāmī nor anyone else has ever said such a thing—none of the adherents of the four legal schools, nor anyone outside them. And supposing, for the sake of argument, that it were indeed a stated view, the only argument advanced against it is that it would be frivolous, and frivolity is impossible for Allah. Yet that proof is invalid on his own principles, because the dispute concerns whether Allah may send down composite letters that carry no meaning, while he holds that the letters are created entities and that Allah may create whatever He wills, since His acts are not contingent upon wisdom or benefit. Hence nothing he has produced counts as evidence against the view in question.

Rather, the well-known point of contention is whether it is permissible for Allah, exalted be He, to reveal something whose meaning cannot be understood. Al-Rāzī, in one of his two opinions, allows for this, agreeing with those who say that “its interpretation is known only to Allah,” even though they define “interpretation” as the very meaning itself.