What is described as lasting, extended, large, great, and the like is never so named—whether long, lasting, extended, large, or great—until its constituent parts have come together; by that conjunction the ruling that applied to the individuals is altered. Once this is understood, suppose we posit a set of contingent effectors that possess no existence of their own, each one in need of an effector. Their mere aggregation does not exempt them from contingency and dependence on another; rather, the more numerous they are, the greater the dependence and need—just as combining one nonexistent thing with another only increases nonexistence.

Now imagine an endless series of causes every one of which is itself an effect, or an infinite succession of agents each of which is produced: all of these are effectors brought into being by something else. Each is contingent in itself, needy of another that created it; among them there is nothing that exists by itself. Claiming that they are without limit merely multiplies the dependency upon the One who exists by Himself and multiplies the contingent entities that are nonexistent in themselves and come to be only through something else. Their multitude and infinitude do not release any of them from being contingent or dependent; without a Creator each would remain nonexistent. Indeed, the aggregate relies on all of its individuals, and if every individual is contingent, the aggregate that depends on them is even more plainly contingent.

Thus it is evident that an infinite chain of causes and effects cannot exist; equally impossible is a plurality of lords, each ruled, or of agents, each an effect, or of effectors, each acted upon by another. All of this is known by necessary self-evidence once the matter is properly conceived, as has been unanimously acknowledged