Rather, all they really establish is that the Agent’s action must be perpetual. Yet if His act were everlasting by His very essence, occurring continuously, one thing after another, their position would be invalidated. Likewise, if every product were originated and always preceded by yet another originated product, their claim would again be nullified.
Second, we say: this premise itself overturns your assertion that, were it permissible for an effect to follow its cause after a delay, the world could come into existence and the act could be posterior to the agent. If, however, such a delay were impossible, the consequence would be either the non-existence of events, their being eternal, or their occurrence without a producer—all of which are untenable. It follows that your claim of a cause whose effect can never be delayed from it is false.
Third, we say: an agent’s preferring one side of a possibility over the other is either possible or impossible. If it is possible, the origination of the cosmos can be deferred, and the capable, volitional agent may determine its occurrence without any further determinant. But if it is said that the agent cannot do so, then a necessarily acting cause-by-essence could not give precedence to one thing over another without a determinant. Yet it is manifest that the world has a particular magnitude, specific attributes, and successive events—all of them contingent. Their being singled out from among other contingencies cannot proceed from a sheer, undifferentiated existence that stands in exactly the same relation to every possibility.
Fourth, we say: with regard to the Eternal, either the occurrence of events in Him is admissible or it is not. If it is not, your doctrine of the world’s eternity collapses, for events do occur within the celestial spheres. If, however, events can subsist in the Necessary-in-His-Essence Eternal, then it is conceivable that an unending series of events should take place in Him, among which are some that serve as a condition for the coming-to-be of