A composite depends upon its component, and that component is something other than it; and whatever depends on something other than itself cannot be necessary in itself. We say to them: if by “other” you mean something external and separate from it, this is false. But if you mean what is included in the very sense of its name, then the essence of your claim is merely that a composite exists only when its part exists, that a whole exists only when some part exists, and that a collection exists only when its individual members exist.

It is evident that when one says, “A thing exists only with the existence of itself,” the statement is sound; so too when it is said, “It exists only with the existence of what is contained within itself—what is called attributes, parts, and the like.” Therefore, if someone argues that this implies its need for something other than itself, it is obvious that such need is less than its need for itself. For if its very self cannot exist except through itself, then its not existing except through what is included within itself is even more fitting. Saying that it “exists only through itself” does not prevent it from being necessary in itself; likewise, saying that it “exists only through what is included in its very notion” is even less an impediment to its being necessary in itself. Dependence on the whole is greater than dependence on a part: one who needs an entire group of ten is more needy than one who needs merely one of the ten. Thus, if the whole cannot exist except with the whole, and this does not preclude the whole from being necessary in itself, then all the more it should not preclude the whole from being necessary in itself when it depends on a single one of its parts.

And when it is said, “Its part is other than it, and whatever depends on something other than itself is contingent in itself,” we answer: if what is meant is that whatever depends on something distinct and separate from it is contingent in itself—