Fourth: composition with respect to quantity, namely the composition of a body from its parts. This may be (a) from discrete substances, which is sensible composition, or (b) from matter and form, which is conceptual composition. These two make up the fourth and fifth kinds.

The full refutation of their view has been presented elsewhere; here we shall merely signal part of it. We say: in truth these matters are not composition at all, and even if they were—as you allege—you have no proof for denying them. On the contrary, the evidence calls for affirming the very realities you have branded as “composition.”

Thus there are three stages to the discussion. The first is to state that you possess no proof for negating the meanings you describe as composition. Your main argument is that whatever is composite is in need of its own part and of a part other than itself, whereas the Necessary Existent cannot be in need of anything beyond Himself. Ibn Sīnā relied on this argument, as did his followers such as al-Rāzī and others, and they built their denial and negation upon it. Yet it is one of the most invalid arguments, for the term “composition” accommodates newly coined meanings according to differing conventions.

The word composite (murakkab) can refer to something put together by another, as in the Almighty’s saying, “in whatever form He willed, He put you together” (Qur’an 82:8). One may also say, “I set the door in its place,” and the like; this is the basic linguistic sense of the term.

The word may likewise be applied to something that was scattered and then gathered together, such as the mixing of compound foods and medicines.