that a certain resemblance must exist externally, while a general, universal meaning resides in the mind, without thereby positing outside the mind some quasi-entity that is neither existent nor non-existent. We therefore answer such people: the only likening (tashbīh) that is impossible is for the Creator to resemble the creature in any property peculiar to the creature, or for the creature to match Him in any of His divine attributes. The Lord—exalted be He—is far above being described by any of the creature’s specific characteristics or having an equal in any aspect of His perfect qualities. Likewise, it is impossible that anyone share with Him, in any respect whatsoever, any of His prerogatives.

Indeed, it is impossible even for two created beings to share, in external reality, one and the same thing. Every existent out there is distinguished by its own essence and the attributes inhering in it; none of these is ever shared by another. Thus, when we say, “These two share such-and-such,” the real meaning is only that one resembles the other in that respect. So, when we say, “This man shares humanity with that man,” or “This animal shares animality with that animal,” we mean that they resemble each other in that general notion. The particular humanity that belongs to Zayd, however, is not shared by anyone else; what they share is merely the kind of absolute humanity, not the concrete humanity that inheres in him.