Likewise he takes pleasure, rejoices, and luxuriates in his mind’s awareness of realities that are perceived inwardly; he also delights in witnessing and sensing his inner self, just as he delights in witnessing and sensing his outward faculties. He enjoys the universal truths his intellect comprehends, and he is equally pleased with his own deeds and movements, just as he delights in eating, drinking, and marital intimacy. In the same vein he finds joy in showing mercy and doing good to those in need—whether relatives or others; he delights in generosity and giving; he delights in pardoning the one who has wronged him and refraining from punishing the offender. It is related that al-Maʾmūn once said, “Pardon has been made so dear to me that I fear I may not be rewarded for it.”
These are the noble traits of character found in the children of Adam, just as they were found among the desert-dwellers. The living soul delights in such perception and voluntary motion, benefits from them, and tastes immediate pleasure through them.
Nor should one say that he acts without purpose, or without seeking some benefit or averting some harm. Rather, these acts do bring benefit and repel harm within himself—just as eating and drinking bring the benefit of satiety and ward off the harm of hunger. In the same way, through all these matters he fends off harms and draws to himself delights.
Hence the expressions, “His soul has been satisfied,” and, “My breast has been healed,” for he finds a cure in his chest just as he finds a cure in his body when illness departs and well-being arrives.
These are matters perceptible both inwardly and outwardly. Their goodness was recognized by those who said that the intellect judges things to be good or bad, and by those who said that knowledge of their goodness is due to an attribute inherent in them—apprehended either intuitively or through reflection, or else known through revelation.
He spoke truly in saying that their goodness or badness lies in a quality inherent in them, and truly in saying that this can be grasped by reason and can also be known through the Sacred Law.
The first view erred in denying that such acts bring benefit to the servant and ward off harm that rebounds upon him—even if that occurs in the Hereafter as well—for this is something tangible. The second view erred when it supposed that this was not due to any quality in the act itself, and that goodness and badness are nothing but mere