good-pleasure, anger, and wrath is to reduce them to nothing more than His will to reward or to punish, then the very objection you raise against affirming will confronts you again in love, aversion, pleasure, and displeasure.

Should someone reinterpret these attributes in terms of their effects—that is, the reward and punishment He brings into being—he is still beset by the same difficulty from which he tried to escape. For any intelligible action must first subsist in the agent, while reward and punishment, as produced effects, only follow an act that the rewarding or punishing agent loves and approves of, or loathes and disapproves of. Thus, if they affirm the act in the very manner in which it is intelligible in the observable case of a human being, they have lapsed into anthropomorphism; and if they insist that it occurs in some other, unknowable fashion, that same claim could be—and should be—made for every other attribute as well.

Section

As for the two illustrative examples:
[First example: Paradise]
Allah—exalted is He—has informed us about what Paradise contains of created things: many varieties of food and drink, garments, and spouses.