of the two; yet his refusal to affirm either alternative in actual fact does not prevent one of them from truly obtaining. It is no more than the ignorance of an uninformed person, or the silence of one who, by keeping quiet, fails to convey realities.

Now, if that which cannot accept either existence or non-existence is more impossible than something imagined to be capable of both—even though both are denied of it—then whatever is conceived as incapable of receiving life or death, knowledge or ignorance, power or incapacity, speech or muteness, blindness or sight, hearing or deafness is closer to non-existence and sheer impossibility than something conceived as capable of those opposites while they are nonetheless negated of it. Accordingly, to deny the opposites while the subject is still receptive to them is nearer to real being and to the possible. Furthermore, whatever is conceivable for the Necessary Existent in terms of receptivity becomes obligatory for Him, because His attributes depend on nothing outside Himself. Hence, if receptivity is possible for Him, it is necessary; and if the existence of what is thus received is possible for Him, it is likewise necessary.

This discussion has been expanded elsewhere, where it is shown that He must be described with every attribute of perfection that admits no deficiency whatsoever.

Third Argument

He was further told: The mere fact that two beings share certain names or attributes is not the tashbih (likening) or tamthil (anthropomorphic comparison) that the textual and rational proofs reject. What those proofs reject is anything that would entail a creature’s participation in what is exclusive to the Creator—namely, what belongs solely to His necessary being