befitting Him, just as the created being possesses a will befitting it. In the same way, He has love that befits Him while the creature has love suited to it; He has pleasure and anger appropriate to Him, and the creature has pleasure and anger appropriate to it.

If someone objects, saying, “Anger is the boiling of the heart’s blood in pursuit of revenge,” he is told: “And will is the inclination of the soul to obtain benefit or ward off harm. If you say, ‘That is the creature’s will,’ we reply, ‘That is likewise the creature’s anger.’ ”

The same line of argument applies to His speech, hearing, sight, knowledge, and power. If, with respect to anger, love, and pleasure, he rejects whatever is specific to created beings, then that specificity is equally absent from hearing, sight, speech, and all the other attributes. But if he maintains that these qualities have no true reality except in the creaturely sense and must therefore be negated of Him, he is told: the very same would have to be said of hearing, sight, speech, knowledge, and power.