And if a given matter lies within the bounds of what ordinarily occurs, then its possibility is already known by recurrent mass transmission, and you yourselves admit this in many other contexts.

Once it is conceded that inanimate objects can be invested with life and everything that follows from life, it follows that every existent could in principle be so described—and the Creator is far worthier of that possibility.

If, on the other hand, by “possibility” you mean merely a mental possibility—namely, the absence of any knowledge that the thing is impossible—then that, too, obtains with respect to God, for no one knows that it is impossible for Him to possess hearing, sight, and speech.

Sixth approach: Suppose, for the sake of argument, that one must establish empirical (external) possibility. The possibility of an attribute’s belonging to something can be known in one of three ways: (1) by actually finding the attribute in that very entity, (2) by finding it in something comparable, or (3) by finding it in something for which the attribute is even more fitting.

It is plain that life, knowledge, power, hearing, sight, and speech exist in created beings and are possible for them. Their possibility for the Creator, exalted be He, is therefore still more assured, for these are perfections, and He is receptive to being described by attributes of perfection. If such attributes are possible for Him, yet He were not characterized by them, He would necessarily be characterized by their opposites.

Seventh approach: The mere negation of these attributes is, in itself, a deficiency in His essence, whether you choose to label that negation “blindness,” “deafness,” and “muteness,” or not. This is self-evident, for if we imagine two existents—one that hears, sees, and speaks,