are such that, when we say, for example, “A triangle is either existent or non-existent,” one might imagine that this falls under the category of privation and possession. That, however, is not the case, for in that category the single subject is devoid of both opposites at once, whereas no contingent being is ever free of either existence or non-existence.

Moreover, on this basis all of the Lord’s attributes are necessary for Him. Thus, when it is said, “Either He is living, knowing, hearing, seeing, and speaking, or He is not,” this is parallel to the statement, “Either He exists or He does not.” The relation involved is that of negation and affirmation, and the same analysis therefore applies to the set of attributes; the intended conclusion thus stands proven.

If it is objected, “This is not sound until it is first established that He is capable of bearing such attributes,”

the reply is: That requirement pertains only to something that can both acquire and lose an attribute, like an animal. As for the Exalted Lord, once an attribute is affirmed for Him it is necessary, for it is inconceivable—by the consensus of rational minds—that He could at one time possess it and at another time be without it. Such a notion would entail that He would sometimes be living and at other times dead, sometimes deaf and at other times hearing, which would ascribe deficiencies to Him, and that is categorically impossible.

This differs from the stance of one who denies the attributes altogether and contends that their negation is no deficiency, imagining that the Divine Essence is not capable of being qualified by them. Anyone who says this cannot then maintain that, were the attribution in fact possible, its denial would still not constitute imperfection; the absurdity of such a claim is self-evident.