scriptural evidence actually rules them out; otherwise, at that point, neither their denial nor their affirmation is permissible.

Moreover, in reality there must be a substantive distinction between what is affirmed of Him and what is denied of Him. Things that are identical with respect to possibility, necessity, or impossibility cannot have some of them singled out—rather than the rest—for possibility, necessity, or impossibility. Consequently, whatever is denied must possess a quality that rightly calls for its negation, and whatever is affirmed must possess a quality that rightly warrants its affirmation.

This may also be expressed as follows: there must be a factor that necessitates denying of Allah whatever must be denied, just as there must be a factor that necessitates affirming for Him whatever is truly affirmed. If scriptural testimony is deemed sufficient, it merely reports how things stand in themselves; so what, in reality, distinguishes the one case from the other?

Scripture and reason together establish for Allah the attributes of perfection and negate from Him

1- whatever conflicts with His perfect attributes.

Thus, everything that runs contrary to the divine attributes of perfection is declared impossible for Him, for the existence of one of two opposites entails the absence of the other. Once it is known that He exists, that His existence is necessary in and of Himself, and that He is eternal and necessarily so, it is likewise known that non-existence is impossible for Him.