so that the discussion of it is the same as the discussion of the Divine Face. They may even say that what they affirm does not conflict with corporeity, just as they say with regard to the other attributes; yet any rational person who reflects will find that the case of what they deny is exactly like the case of what they affirm—there is no difference.

Reply of the Affirmers to this Objection

The whole argument of these people rests on two premises: that affirming the attributes entails corporealism, and that all bodies are identical. The Affirmers respond in various ways—sometimes by denying the first premise, sometimes by denying the second, sometimes by denying both premises, and sometimes by asking for clarification.

There is no doubt that their claim that all bodies are identical is false, whether they define a body as something that can be pointed to, as something that subsists by itself, as mere existence, or as a composite of matter and form, and the like. If, however, they define it as a compound of discrete particles while holding those particles to be identical, then the entire issue rests on the soundness of that notion and on