Thus, when these critics attach the labels “tashbih” (anthropomorphism) and “tamthil” (likening God to creation) to the attribute-affirmers, they do so on the basis of their own creed—a creed the latter firmly dispute. The attribute-affirmers answer them: “Suppose that, in the usage of some people, this point is called tashbih; still, neither reason nor revelation has ruled it out. What must be negated is only what sound textual and rational proofs actually negate.”

The Quran certainly rejects the notion of any “mithl” (equal), “kufuʾ” (peer), “nidd” (rival), and the like. Yet they argue that, in Arabic, an attribute is not the equal, peer, or rival of the one described; therefore it is not included in those verses. As for sheer reason, it does not invalidate what the Muʿtazilah choose to term tashbih.

Another of their analogies is the claim that affirming the attributes entails corporeality and that all bodies are alike. They maintain: “Attributes can reside only in a spatially-bounded body, and all bodies are identical; so if attributes were to subsist in Him, He would necessarily resemble every other body—and that is tashbih.”

Many among the very ṣifātiyya who affirm the attributes yet deny His exaltedness above the Throne or the occurrence of voluntary acts in His being, and so forth, make the same claim. They say: attributes can indeed subsist in something that is not a body, but as for elevation above the universe, it is not