denies it has in fact taken the wording to bear a particular meaning. On the basis of this division, the contradiction that besets many people—both those who deny the divine attributes and those who affirm them—becomes clear.

Sixth Principle – Clarifying the criterion by which the sound and the unsound approaches to negation and affirmation are recognized

One may legitimately say: In this field we must have a criterion that tells us what may and may not be ascribed to Allah, exalted is He, whether by way of negation or affirmation. To rely solely on the blanket denial of resemblance (tashbīh) or on unrestricted affirmation while merely disclaiming resemblance is unsound, for between any two things there is always a point of similarity and a point of distinction.

The error of basing negation merely on the allegation of resemblance

If the one who negates an attribute does so on the grounds that it constitutes tashbīh, we answer: If by that you mean absolute identity in every respect, then yes, that is impossible. But if you mean a partial likeness in some respects while differing in others, or simply the sharing of a name, the same consequence follows for every attribute you do accept. The evidence you advance only refutes tashbīh and tamāthul as you yourselves define them—namely, that whatever is possible for one is possible for the other, whatever is impossible for one is impossible for the other, and whatever is necessary for one is necessary for the other.