Al-Shāfiʿī: the judgment is annulled.
If the witnesses themselves retract their testimony, this may occur either before or after judgment. If the retraction precedes judgment, the majority rule that no judgment may stand, though some jurists hold that it does stand. If the retraction follows judgment, Mālik maintains that the judgment remains in force, whereas others declare it void.
In Mālik’s view, witnesses are liable for any loss caused by their testimony. If the loss involves property, they must make restitution in every circumstance. ʿAbd al-Malik says they are not liable in cases of honest error, and al-Shāfiʿī likewise absolves them of financial liability.
If blood is involved and the witnesses plead mistake, they must pay the blood money; but if they confess deliberate falsehood, retribution (qiṣāṣ) is taken from them according to Ashhab, while Ibn al-Qāsim holds that no qiṣāṣ is exacted.
[SIXTH CHAPTER: THE TIME OF JUDGMENT]
When, then, should judgment be rendered? The matter has three aspects: (1) the judge’s personal state, (2) the moment the ruling is executed and finalized, and (3) the time at which the disputed object is seized and possession removed from the defendant when the transaction involved unfair dealing.
When should the judge give judgment? Only when his mind is unencumbered, for the Messenger of God ﷺ said, “A judge must not judge while he is angry.” Mālik extends this to thirst, hunger, fear, and any other condition that obstructs understanding. Nevertheless, if a judge in such a state issues a correct ruling, the jurists—so far as I know—agree that it takes effect. Some, however, argue that in the very case expressly mentioned—anger—the ruling is invalid, because the prohibition indicates the invalidity of the prohibited act.
When is the judgment carried out against the losing party? Only after a grace period has been set and notice given. Executing the judgment means either upholding the plaintiff’s proof or overturning it. May the judge hear further argument after judgment? Mālik’s statements differ. The more prevalent report is that he will listen in cases that concern God’s right—such as charitable endowments or emancipation—but not otherwise. Others hold that he hears nothing once the judgment is final; this is called taʿjīz. Yet another view bars hearing either party, while a fourth distinguishes between plaintiff and defendant, especially when the defendant admits inability.
As for the time of seizing the disputed item, it is when the claim is established but before notice is served. If the person from whose hand the item is taken does not wish to litigate, he may reclaim its price from the seller. If, to do so, he needs the seller’s cooperation—either to prove the purchase if the seller denies it or to have him acknowledge it if he admits—then the rightful claimant may take the article from him and leave its value in his possession.
Al-Shāfiʿī says: he must purchase it from the possessor; if it perishes while in that possessor’s hand, he is liable. Should it perish during litigation, who bears the loss? Opinions differ. Some say that if it perishes after ownership has been established, liability falls on the claimant; others say the claimant is liable only after the final judgment, whereas after establishment but before judgment liability rests with the possessor.
The Qāḍī—may God be pleased with him—said: You should know that Sharīʿah rulings are of two kinds: those that judges enforce (and almost everything cited in this book belongs here) and those that judges do not enforce, most of which fall under what is merely recommended.