against them on the strength of his own knowledge—may Allah bless him and grant him peace.

As for the underlying rationale, it is the suspicion of bias that could attach to the judge were he to rule from personal knowledge. The scholars unanimously agree that such suspicion carries legal weight. Thus, according to the majority, an intentional killer does not inherit from the person he murdered, and a father’s testimony on behalf of his son is rejected, among other well-known examples cited by the jurists.

Those who permit the judge to rule on the basis of what he knows advance two kinds of evidence.

1. Transmitted proof: the ḥadīth reported by ʿĀʾishah about Hind bint ʿUtbah ibn Rabīʿah and her husband Abū Sufyān ibn Ḥarb. When Hind complained to the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—about Abū Sufyān’s stinginess, he said to her, “Take what suffices you and your children in a reasonable manner,” without first hearing her husband’s side.

2. Rational proof: if a judge is allowed to rule on the testimony of a witness—which, for him, amounts only to probability—then it is even more fitting that he rule on what is certain to him personally.

Abū Ḥanīfah and his companions nonetheless restricted the matters in which a judge may apply his own knowledge. They said: the judge may not do so in ḥudūd cases, but he may in everything else. Abū Ḥanīfah further limited the type of knowledge that qualifies: the judge may rule only on what he learns during the court session, not on what he knew beforehand.

It is related that ʿUmar passed judgment against Abū Sufyān in favor of a man from Banū Makhzūm on the basis of his own knowledge.

Some of Mālik’s associates held that the judge may rule by what he comes to know in the courtroom—that is, by what he himself hears—even if no formal testimony is presented. This, as we have said, is the position of the majority. Al-Mughīra’s view, however, is more consistent with foundational principles, for the default in this Sharīʿah is that no judgment is issued except on the basis of proof, even if the resulting preponderance of probability is stronger than that achieved by the testimony of two witnesses.

Chapter Four: Confession

When a confession is unequivocal, there is no disagreement that judgment must follow it. The discussion concerns whose confession is admissible and whose is not; and if the wording of the confession is ambiguous, the dispute is lifted. The rules defining whose confession counts have already been presented. The number of confessions required has likewise been discussed in the chapter on ḥudūd, and they agree that a single confession obliges payment in property cases. The issues over which they differ arise from the possible meanings of the wording; should you wish to examine them, consult the works on detailed branches of the law.

Section Four: Knowing for whom and against whom judgment may be rendered

Against whom, and for whom, may a judge pronounce judgment? The jurists concur that he may rule in favor of one regarding whom he is not suspected of partiality. They disagreed, however, about his judging in the case of one toward whom such suspicion exists.

Mālik said: he may not adjudicate against a person for whom his own testimony would be inadmissible. Others maintained that he may, because a judgment rests on established causes, whereas testimony does not.