Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, and Abū Ḥanīfah differed when a judge calls witnesses to attest his written decision yet does not read its contents aloud to them.
Mālik said: “It is valid.”
Al-Shāfiʿī and Abū Ḥanīfah said: “It is not valid; the testimony does not stand.”

They also disagreed about the leather pouch and its string that serve as identifying marks for a piece of found property: may judgment be given on their basis alone, without any witnesses, or must testimony be produced?
Mālik said: “Judgment may be rendered on that basis.”
Al-Shāfiʿī said: “Two witnesses are indispensable,” and Abū Ḥanīfah agreed.
Mālik’s view corresponds more closely to the wording of the ḥadīths, while the contrary view accords more closely with general legal principles.

Among the disputed questions in this chapter is whether a judge may rule on the strength of his personal knowledge. The scholars unanimously agree that he may rely on what he personally knows when declaring witnesses upright or unreliable, that if witnesses testify to something he knows to be false he must not rule by their testimony, and that he may use his own knowledge concerning a litigant’s admission or denial—except Mālik, who required the judge to summon two witnesses to the litigant’s confession or repudiation.
They likewise concur that a judge may invoke his own knowledge when he finds the proof of one party weightier than that of the other, provided the point at issue is uncontested. They differed, however, when the matter itself is disputed.
Some said: “His ruling is not set aside so long as it does not violate consensus.”
Others said: “It is set aside if the view he adopts is anomalous.”
Still others said: “It is set aside whenever it rests on analogy while a passage from the Qur’an or Sunnah exists that contradicts that analogy”—and this last position is more equitable, unless the analogy is supported by foundational texts, the Qur’anic wording allows the reading, and the Sunnah report is not mass-transmitted.

This is the criterion that should govern any jurist who prefers analogy over a transmitted report, as is unanimously attributed to Abū Ḥanīfah and—though with disagreement—to Mālik.

They also disagreed whether a judge may pass judgment against someone solely on the basis of his own knowledge, without proof or confession, or whether he may rule only when proof or confession is present.
Mālik and most of his companions said: “He may rule only on the basis of evidence or confession”; this was also the opinion of Aḥmad and Shurayḥ.
Al-Shāfiʿī, the Kufans, Abū Thawr, and a number of other scholars held: “The judge may rule according to his personal knowledge.”
Both camps have precedents among the Companions and Successors, and each side supports its stance with transmitted reports and reasoned argument.

The principal evidence cited by those who forbid such rulings includes the ḥadīth related by Maʿmar from al-Zuhrī, from ʿUrwah, from ʿĀʾishah:

“The Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—sent Abū Jahm to collect the alms-tax. A man disputed with him over the obligatory share, and injuries ensued. They brought the matter to the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—who awarded them the compensation for wounds. He then said, ‘I am going to address the people and inform them that you have accepted; have you accepted?’ They answered, ‘Yes.’ The Messenger of Allah—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—ascended the pulpit, addressed the people, and recounted the incident, then asked, ‘Are you satisfied?’ They said, ‘No.’ The Emigrants were about to take action against them, so the Messenger of Allah—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—came down, paid them, then mounted the pulpit and spoke again, after which he asked, ‘Are you satisfied now?’ They replied, ‘Yes.’ ”

This shows plainly that he did not adjudicate