and in other situations they disagreed, some giving effect to the presumption of suspicion, others setting it aside.

Among the matters on which they all concur is the rejection of a father’s testimony in favor of his son and a son’s in favor of his father; the same applies to a mother’s testimony for her son and a son’s for his mother.

They disagreed, however, about the impact of suspicion on the testimony of spouses for one another. Mālik and Abū Ḥanīfah exclude it, whereas al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Thawr, and al-Ḥasan deem it admissible.

Ibn Abī Laylā maintained that a husband’s testimony on behalf of his wife is accepted, but her testimony on his behalf is not—and this is also the view of al-Nakhaʿī.

They also agree that the testimony of a brother for his brother is admissible, provided—according to Mālik—that the witness is not warding off personal disgrace thereby, and that he is not wholly dependent upon his brother for continual benefit. Al-Awzāʿī alone dissented, declaring such testimony impermissible.

From the same category arises their dispute over the admissibility of an enemy’s testimony against his enemy: Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī rule it inadmissible, while Abū Ḥanīfah rules it admissible.

The main textual proof cited by the majority for rejecting testimony tainted by suspicion is the Prophet’s—peace and blessings be upon him—saying:

“The testimony of a litigant or of one under suspicion is not accepted,”

as well as the report recorded by Abū Dāwūd in which he—peace and blessings be upon him—said:

“The testimony of a Bedouin against a townsman is not accepted,”

because a Bedouin seldom witnesses what occurs in the town. These are their evidences from transmitted texts.

Their rational proof is the very presence of suspicion, for the majority agree that suspicion has legal effect—just as they agree that a killer does not inherit from his victim and that a wife irrevocably divorced during a death-illness does inherit, despite the subsidiary disagreement over that question.

The second group—Shurayḥ, Abū Thawr, and Dāwūd—hold that the father’s testimony for his son is accepted, a fortiori the testimony of anyone else, provided the father is upright. Their scriptural evidence is the Almighty’s words:

“O you who believe! Stand firmly for justice, as witnesses for Allah, even against yourselves, your parents, or your close relatives” (al-Nisāʾ 4:135).

A command implies the validity of the act commanded, except where consensus has specifically excluded it, namely a person’s testimony on his own behalf.

From the standpoint of reason they argue that testimony is rejected solely on account of the suspicion of falsehood; the Law activates this suspicion only in the case of an impious witness and forbids applying it to an upright one—probity and suspicion cannot coexist.

As for the number and gender of witnesses, the Muslims are unanimous that fornication cannot be proven with fewer than four upright male witnesses, and they are unanimous that every other right, apart from fornication, is established with two upright male witnesses—save for al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī, who held that fewer than four witnesses are insufficient, by analogy with the punishment of stoning. This view is weak because of His statement