If a person’s iniquity results from slanderous accusation (qadhf), Abū Ḥanīfah holds that his testimony is never to be admitted, even after he repents, whereas the majority say it may be accepted. The dispute turns on whether the exception in the Almighty’s words

“and never accept their testimony ever; such people are indeed ungodly” (al-Nūr 24:4),

“except those who repent thereafter” (al-Nūr 24:5)

goes back to the clause immediately preceding it or applies to the entire ruling—apart, that is, from the point on which consensus has limited it, namely that repentance does not void the prescribed ḥadd penalty, as noted earlier.

Puberty. All agree that wherever probity is required, puberty is likewise required. They differed, however, over children testifying against one another in cases of injury or homicide. The majority of the jurists of the urban centers rejected such testimony, arguing (as stated before) that testimony demands probity and probity demands puberty. For that reason, Mālik does not regard it as true “testimony” at all but merely an evidentiary circumstance; he therefore stipulates that the children must not disperse, lest they become intimidated and retract.

Mālik’s associates disagreed over whether such testimony is valid if an adult is among the children or not, yet they concurred that the normal numerical requirement for testimony must still be met. They also differed on whether maleness is a condition in this context, and on whether the testimony may be used in a homicide that has taken place among them. Mālik’s only support here is a report traced to Ibn al-Zubayr.

Al-Shāfiʿī said: If someone argues on the basis of that report, he may be told that Ibn ʿAbbās rejected it, and that the Qur’an itself points to its invalidity. Ibn Abī Laylā and a group of Successors sided with Mālik, and Mālik’s permissiveness in this matter stems from his acceptance of analogical reasoning in pursuit of public welfare (maṣlaḥah).

Islam. They unanimously agree that Islam is a condition for admitting testimony and that the testimony of a non-Muslim is inadmissible, save for their disagreement over its permissibility regarding a bequest made during travel, in light of the verse,

“O you who believe! When death approaches one of you, let two just men from among you testify, or two others from outside your community” (al-Māʾidah 5:106).

Abū Ḥanīfah allows this under the conditions set by Allah, whereas Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī do not, holding that the verse has been abrogated.

Freedom. The majority of the jurists of the provincial centers require freedom for testimony to be accepted. The Ẓāhirīs allow the testimony of a slave, on the grounds that the basic requirement is probity and servitude in itself is no cause for rejection unless the Book, the Sunnah, or consensus proves otherwise. The majority, however, seem to regard slavery as a residual effect of unbelief and therefore treat it as a bar to testimony.

Suspicion arising from affection. The scholars unanimously agree that suspicion born of special affection invalidates testimony. They differ, though, over rejecting the testimony of an upright person when suspicion stems from either affection or dislike rooted in worldly enmity. The jurists of the major centers rule that it should indeed be set aside, although they agree that in certain cases the suspicion is to be acted upon and in others