Book of Judicial Rulings
Chapter One: Identifying Those Whose Judgments Are Valid
The material of this Book is confined to six chapters:
- Identifying who may lawfully serve as judge;
- Identifying the sources on which judgment is to be based;
- Identifying the matters that fall under judicial authority;
- Identifying the parties for or against whom judgment may be rendered;
- The manner in which judgment is to be delivered; and
- The proper time for adjudication.
Chapter One concerns those whose judgments are acceptable and the qualities that render a judge more meritorious.
The minimum qualifications are that the judge be a free Muslim, of age, male, sane, and morally upright.
It has been reported within the school that manifest iniquity necessitates his removal from office, though the rulings he has already issued remain in force.
The scholars disagreed over whether he must be qualified for independent juristic reasoning (ijtihād). Al-Shāfiʿī ruled that such qualification is mandatory, and ʿAbd al-Wahhāb relates the same position for our school. Abū Ḥanīfah, however, held that the judgment of a layman is permissible.
The Qāḍī states: This appears to be the view my grandfather—may Allah have mercy on him—set forth in the Muqaddimāt, for he listed ijtihād among the commendable, not obligatory, traits.
They also differed over the requirement of maleness. The majority view is that it is a condition for the validity of a judgment. Abū Ḥanīfah allowed a woman to serve as judge in financial matters, while al-Ṭabarī permitted her to judge without restriction in every matter.
ʿAbd al-Wahhāb said: I know of no disagreement that freedom is required.
Those who rejected a woman’s appointment compared it to the supreme Imamate and likened her status to that of a slave on account of her diminished legal authority. Those who permitted her judgment in financial cases did so by analogy to the admissibility of her testimony in such matters. Those who deemed her rulings valid in all cases argued that the default principle is that anyone capable of adjudicating between people may judge, except where scholarly consensus has excluded an office, namely the supreme Imamate.
Regarding the requirement of freedom, there is no dispute whatsoever. Likewise, within Mālik’s school it is undisputed that hearing, sight, and speech are necessary for the continuation of a judge’s mandate, though not for its initial validity, for among the qualities