The jurists also debated a well-known corollary of this chapter: what if several people, acting together, steal property that meets the legal threshold for amputation—namely, a full niṣāb—yet the share taken by each individual falls short of that amount? Suppose, for example, they jointly remove from its place of safekeeping a load or chest whose total value equals the niṣāb. Mālik ruled that the hands of all the participants are to be cut off; this is likewise the position of al-Shāfiʿī, Aḥmad, and Abū Thawr. Abū Ḥanīfah, on the other hand, held that no one’s hand is severed unless the portion seized by each person amounts to a niṣāb.

Those who impose the penalty on the entire group regard the punishment as being tied to the value of the property stolen: that quantity, they say, is what triggers amputation in order to safeguard people’s wealth. Those who oppose them argue that the threshold was fixed at that level—no less—out of respect for the sanctity of the human hand; therefore, they contend, multiple hands should not be severed in a case for which the Law prescribes the cutting of only one hand.

They also differed as to the point in time at which the stolen goods should be valued. Mālik said: on the day of the theft. Abū Ḥanīfah said: on the day judgment is rendered.

The second condition for enforcing this ḥadd is that the property must have been taken from a place of safekeeping (ḥirz). All the leading jurists of the great cities, whose opinions guide legal verdicts, together with their disciples, agree that such safekeeping is a prerequisite for amputation, even though they disagree over what precisely constitutes a ḥirz and what does not.

The soundest definition appears to be that a ḥirz is any arrangement normally used to guard wealth and make it difficult to take—locks, pens, enclosures, and the like—as well as the act, to be detailed later, by which the thief is deemed to have removed the property from that ḥirz.

This view is espoused by Mālik, Abū Ḥanīfah, al-Shāfiʿī, al-Thawrī, and their respective followers. By contrast, the Ẓāhirīs and a group of ḥadīth scholars say that amputation is due whenever the niṣāb is stolen, even if it is taken from somewhere that is not a ḥirz.

The majority rely on the ḥadīth of ʿAmr ibn Shuʿayb, from his father, from his grandfather, that the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—said:

“Amputation is not carried out for fruit still hanging on the tree nor for livestock grazing in the mountains; but once the fruit has been brought into the courtyard or the threshing floor, then, if it reaches the value of a shield, the hand is to be cut off.”

They also cite the mursal report of Mālik from ʿAbd Allāh ibn ʿAbd al-Raḥmān ibn Abī Ḥusayn al-Makkī to the same effect.

The Ẓāhirīs base themselves on the general wording of the Almighty’s statement:

“As for the thief, male or female, cut off their hands” (Q 5:38).

They argue that the verse must be taken at face value except where an authentic Sunnah restricts it—and the Sunnah has indeed specified the minimum amount that entails amputation. They therefore reject the ḥadīth of ʿAmr ibn Shuʿayb because of the scholarly disagreement surrounding his narrations.

Abū ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-Barr responded: acting upon the ḥadīths of ʿAmr ibn Shuʿayb is obligatory when they are transmitted by trustworthy narrators.

As for ḥirz according to those who deem it a condition, they agree on some particulars and differ on others. They concur, for instance, that the door of a house and its lock constitute a ḥirz, but disagree about containers; they also agree that someone who steals from a room in a dwelling not shared with others is not subject to amputation until he exits the house, yet differ concerning a residence that is jointly occupied.