As for establishing fornication or adultery by means of witnesses, the scholars are unanimous that it may indeed be proven through testimony and that the requisite number of witnesses is four—unlike all other legal claims. This rests on the Almighty’s words, “Then, if they do not bring four witnesses …” (al-Nūr 24:4). They further concur that the witnesses must be upright and that, for their testimony to be valid, they must have observed the man’s sexual organ penetrating the woman’s, and must state this explicitly, not by innuendo.

The majority also stipulate that the witnesses must not differ with one another regarding either the time or the place of the act, save for the celebrated “corners” case reported from Abū Ḥanīfah, in which each of the four testifies that he saw the intercourse taking place in a different corner of the house from that described by the others.

The point in dispute is whether testimonies that diverge as to location may be amalgamated, just as those that diverge as to time may not. Since all agree that testimonies differing in time cannot be combined, and since place is analogous to time, the prevalent view is that they likewise cannot be joined. The apparent intent of the Sharīʿah is to demand especially stringent verification before this particular ḥadd is applied—more so than for any other ḥadd.

They also disagreed about enforcing the ḥadd solely on the basis of a woman’s pregnancy when she claims coercion. One group, following Mālik and the report of ʿUmar recorded in the Muwaṭṭaʾ, holds that the ḥadd is to be carried out unless she presents some indication of coercion—for example, that she was a virgin who now appears bleeding, or that she displays visible traces of assault. The same applies, in his view, when she claims to be married, unless she provides evidence for that claim, except in the case of a newcomer: Ibn al-Qāsim states that if she is new to the area and claims a husband, her word is accepted.

Abū Ḥanīfah and al-Shāfiʿī, however, contend that pregnancy does not subject her to the ḥadd when she pleads either coercion or marriage, even if she adduces no proof; she is, they say, like one who confesses and then alleges compulsion.

Among their proofs is the ḥadīth of Shurāḥah, in which ʿAlī—may Allah be pleased with him—asked her, “Were you forced?” She replied, “No.” He then said, “Perhaps a man came to you while you were asleep.” They also cite sound reports that ʿUmar accepted the statement of a woman who claimed to be a heavy sleeper and to have been visited by a man who then departed, whose identity she never discovered.

There is no dispute among Muslims that a woman who was coerced incurs no ḥadd; the sole disagreement concerns whether she is entitled to a bridal-gift (ṣadāq). The difference turns on whether the mahr is considered compensation for sexual enjoyment or a gracious gift. Whoever views it as compensation obligates it whether the intercourse was lawful or unlawful, whereas whoever sees it as a gift that Allah has reserved for lawful spouses does not obligate it.

This foundational discussion suffices for the present book, and Allah alone grants success to what is right.