That, then, is the view adopted by Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Ḥanīfah and his associates, as well as the Ẓāhirī scholars: the man is to be detained and disciplined until he performs the prayer.

The cause of this divergence lies in the differing textual proofs. It is authentically established that the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—said:

“The blood of a Muslim is not lawful except in one of three cases: disbelief after faith, adultery after a lawful marriage, or killing a soul without right.”

Yet it is also related from him—peace and blessings be upon him—in the ḥadīth of Buraydah:

“The covenant that distinguishes us from them is the prayer; whoever abandons it has committed disbelief.”

And in the ḥadīth of Jābir the Prophet—may Allah bless him and grant him peace—said:

“Between a servant and disbelief—or, he said, polytheism—stands nothing but the abandonment of the prayer.”

Whoever takes the word “disbelief” in these reports in its literal sense treats them as an explanation of his statement, “disbelief after faith,” and therefore rules that the offender is to be executed as an apostate. Whoever understands the wording as stern rebuke—that his deeds are the deeds of an unbeliever and that he outwardly resembles one—as in his saying, “The adulterer does not commit adultery while he is a believer, and the thief does not steal while he is a believer,” does not regard killing him on the charge of disbelief to be warranted.

As for those who maintain that he is to be executed merely as a ḥadd punishment, their position is weak; it rests on no firm evidence other than a tenuous analogy—namely, likening prayer, the foremost of obligations, to murder, the foremost of prohibitions.

In sum, the term “disbelief” in its primary sense denotes denial. It is evident that the one who abandons the prayer is not a denier—unless he leaves it while holding such abandonment to be permissible. We are therefore faced with two possibilities:

1. We understand the ḥadīth to speak of real disbelief; in that case we must interpret it as referring to the person who forsakes the prayer believing it lawful to do so, and such a one has indeed disbelieved.

2. We take the word “disbelief” as being used figuratively, and that may be in one of two ways: (a) that he is to be treated like an unbeliever—execution and all other rulings that apply to unbelievers—even though he is not literally a denier; or (b) that his deeds are described as those of an unbeliever purely for emphasis and deterrence, meaning that his conduct resembles that of an unbeliever, for the unbeliever does not pray, just as the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—said: “The adulterer does not commit adultery while he is a believer.”

To adopt the view that he is legally treated as an unbeliever in every respect requires explicit proof; without such evidence, that conclusion cannot be upheld.