the ʿāqilah.

They also disagreed about the case in which both an intentional killer and a child participate in the homicide. Those who impose retribution (qiṣāṣ) on the intentional killer and a diyah on the child differ as to whom the child’s diyah should be charged.
Al-Shāfiʿī, staying true to his principle, holds that it is taken from the child’s own property.
Mālik says that it falls upon the ʿāqilah, whereas Abū Ḥanīfah is of the view that no qiṣāṣ is due between the two.

As for the time at which the diyah becomes payable, the jurists agree that the diyah for accidental killing is deferred and paid in three yearly instalments, whereas the diyah for intentional killing is due immediately—unless the parties agree to postpone it.

Who, then, counts as the ʿāqilah? The majority of the scholars of the Ḥijāz agree that the ʿāqilah are the paternal relatives, the agnates, rather than the members of the military register (dīwān). In their view the mawālī (clients) assume the liability if the agnates are unable to meet it, with the exception of Dāwūd, who does not regard the mawālī as agnates.

According to Mālik there is no fixed amount that each member of the ʿāqilah must pay. Al-Shāfiʿī, by contrast, stipulates one dinar for the wealthy and half a dinar for the poor, and he apportions the liability among paternal relatives in order of proximity: first the sons of the offender’s father, then those of his grandfather, then those of the grandfather’s sons. Abū Ḥanīfah and his colleagues maintain that the ʿāqilah are the members of the offender’s dīwān, if he belongs to one.

The Ḥijāzī scholars base their position on the fact that people bore one another’s diyah in the time of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ and of Abū Bakr, when no dīwān yet existed; the dīwān was instituted only under ʿUmar ibn al-Khaṭṭāb. The Kufans, on the other hand, rely on the ḥadīth of Jubayr ibn Muṭʿim:

‘There is no alliance (ḥilf) in Islam; any alliance that existed in the pre-Islamic era is only strengthened by Islam.’

In short, they cling to this evidence in the same way they argue for the obligation of walāʾ in favour of allies.

The jurists also differed about one who has neither agnates nor mawālī—that is, the sāʾibah—if he commits accidental homicide. Is any diyah due, and, if so, upon whom does it fall? Those who deny that such a person has mawālī say that no diyah is owed; so too those—among them Dāwūd and his followers—who do not place the liability upon the mawālī. Others maintain that if his walāʾ belongs to his manumitter, the latter must pay; others say that if his walāʾ belongs to the whole Muslim community, the liability is drawn from the public treasury (Bayt al-Māl); and those who allow a sāʾibah to affiliate himself to whomever he wishes place the diyah upon the patron he chooses.

All these opinions are reported from the early generations. Diyahs vary according to the status of the person for whom they are paid, and the circumstances that reduce the diyah are: femaleness, unbelief, and slavery.

With regard to women, the scholars agree that for taking life the diyah of a woman is half that of a man. They differ, however, about lesser injuries—wounds and the loss of limbs—as will be discussed under the diyahs for injuries and body-parts.

As for the People of the Covenant (dhimmīs) who are killed by mistake, the scholars hold three opinions. The first is that their diyah is half that of a Muslim: their males receive half the diyah of Muslim males,