sheep; for those whose wealth is in cattle, two hundred head of cattle; and for those who trade in mantle-cloths, two hundred garments. Their chief proof is the ḥadīth of ʿAmr ibn Shuʿayb, from his father, from his grandfather that was cited earlier, together with what Abū Bakr ibn Abī Shaybah transmitted on the authority of ʿAṭāʾ:

“The Messenger of Allah ﷺ levied the diyah upon people according to their assets: upon the camel-owners one hundred camels, upon the sheep-owners two thousand sheep, upon the cattle-owners two hundred head of cattle, and upon the people of garments two hundred suits.”

They also rely on what is narrated from ʿUmar ibn ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz—that he wrote to the provincial armies stating that the diyah in the time of the Messenger of Allah ﷺ was one hundred camels. He added: “If the victim belongs to the Bedouins, his diyah is to be paid in camels; the Bedouin is not to be charged gold or silver. Should he be unable to provide one hundred camels, the equivalent is one thousand sheep.” The scholars of Iraq, moreover, have transmitted from ʿUmar a wording identical to the ḥadīth of ʿAmr ibn Shuʿayb.

The first party argues that, were it permissible to value the diyah in sheep or cattle, it would likewise be permissible to value it in grain for grain-growers or in horses for horse-owners—yet no scholar says this.

As I have stated, deliberation over the diyah involves five questions: its type, its amount, upon whom it is imposed, the form in which it is paid, and the time at which it becomes due. With respect to type and amount, we have already discussed the case of free Muslim males.

As for upon whom it is imposed, there is no disagreement that the diyah for accidental killing is borne by the ʿāqilah, and that this ruling is an exception to the general words of the Exalted:

“Nor does any bearer of burden bear the burden of another.” (Q 6:164)

and to the Prophet’s ﷺ statement to Abū Rimthah and his son: “He incurs no liability on your account, and you incur no liability on his.”

Regarding the diyah for intentional homicide, the majority hold that it is not borne by the ʿāqilah, basing themselves on the report from Ibn ʿAbbās—unopposed by any Companion—in which he said: “The ʿāqilah do not bear responsibility for deliberate homicide, nor for an admission of liability, nor for a settlement reached in a case of deliberate homicide.”

The majority likewise maintain that the ʿāqilah do not bear the diyah of a person who injures or kills himself by mistake, whereas al-Awzāʿī was alone in saying: Whoever marches out to strike the enemy and ends up killing himself—the diyah is upon his ʿāqilah. He held the same with respect to unintentional severing of limbs. It is related that ʿUmar ruled for a man who burst his own eye by mistake, awarding its diyah against that man’s ʿāqilah.

They differ over the diyah for quasi-intentional homicide and over the aggravated diyah, forming two opinions, and they disagree as to who bears the diyah for injuries caused by the insane or by minors. Mālik, Abū Ḥanīfah, and a number of scholars say that in all such cases the diyah is borne by the ʿāqilah. Al-Shāfiʿī says: The intentional act of a minor is paid from the minor’s own property.

The root of their disagreement is that a minor’s act hovers between the intentional and the accidental: whoever deems it closer to intentional obligates the diyah against the minor’s property, whereas whoever deems it closer to accidental obligates it upon