Book of Blood-Money for Human Life

The foundation of this chapter is the Almighty’s saying:

“Whoever kills a believer by mistake must free a believing slave and pay blood-money to the victim’s family, unless they remit it.”
(Q 4:92)

In the Sacred Law the amounts of blood-money (diyāt) vary according to the type of bloodshed, according to the persons upon whom payment falls, and—where both sides consent—according to whether the killing was intentional; otherwise the right holder is entitled to retaliation, as explained earlier.

The jurist must therefore consider: 1) the act that gives rise to the diyah (that is, in which kind of killing it becomes obligatory); 2) its form and amount; 3) the time at which it falls due; and 4) the party upon whom it is imposed.

1. In which kind of killing is a diyah obligatory?
   The scholars agree that it is due for accidental homicide; for intentional homicide committed by someone not legally accountable, such as a lunatic or a child; and for intentional homicide in which the sanctity of the victim is less than that of the killer, as in the case of a free man who kills his own slave.
   Within accidental homicide there are cases unanimously deemed accidental and others about which the jurists disagree. Earlier we treated some of these; later we shall discuss their dispute over the liability of the rider, the driver, and the guide.

2. Its amount and form
   They concur that the diyah for a free Muslim, when paid in camels, is one hundred camels.

• According to Mālik, this overarching figure is subdivided into three distinct diyāt: the diyah for accidental killing, the diyah for intentional killing when retaliation is waived, and the diyah for quasi-intentional killing. The last is exemplified, in Mālik’s most widely transmitted view, by the case of the Mudlijī who slew his son.

• Al-Shāfiʿī recognises only two categories: a light diyah and a heavy diyah. The light diyah is for accidental killing; the heavy diyah covers both intentional and quasi-intentional homicide.

• Abū Ḥanīfah likewise has only two diyāt: one for accidental killing and one for quasi-intentional killing. In his view there is no fixed diyah for outright intentional homicide; rather, the obligation is whatever settlement the two sides agree upon, and it becomes due immediately. This, in essence, is also the purport of Mālik’s well-known statement, for once payment is contingent on a mutual settlement there is little point in calling it a diyah—unless one adopts the report that it is to be deferred like the diyah of accidental killing, in which case its ruling departs from that of ordinary property transferred by agreement.

In Mālik’s school, when a diyah is accepted for intentional homicide, it is apportioned into quarters: twenty-five bint makhāḍ, twenty-five bint labūn, twenty-five ḥiqqah, and twenty-five jadh‘ah. This is also the view related from Ibn Shihāb and Rabī‘ah.

His aggravated diyah (mughal·laẓah) is paid in thirds: thirty ḥiqqah, thirty jadh‘ah, and forty khalifah (i.e., pregnant she-camels). According to the prevalent opinion in his school the aggravated form applies only in cases akin to the Mudlijī’s killing of his son.

Al-Shāfiʿī holds that the diyah for quasi-intentional homicide is likewise in thirds, and he narrates the same from ‘Umar and Zayd ibn Thābit.

Abū Thawr says that, when the heir of the slain pardons in an intentional case, the diyah is paid in fifths, just as in accidental homicide.

The jurists have also differed over the ages of the camels comprising the diyah for accidental killing. Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī say that it is paid in fifths: twenty