Ibn al-Qāsim transmits this opinion from Mālik in agreement with al-Shāfiʿī, whereas al-Mughīrah—one of Mālik’s own students—and Ibn Dīnār adopt the opposing view.

The jurists of Kūfah state: A sound-sighted person whose eye has been gouged out is entitled only to retaliation (qiṣāṣ) or to whatever settlement the two parties conclude. Others have said that he may not exact retaliation from a one-eyed assailant; instead, the latter must pay the full diyyah. This report is attributed to Ibn al-Musayyib and to ʿUthmān.

The rationale of those who hold this last view is that the remaining eye of a one-eyed man stands in the place of two eyes; therefore, whoever destroys it in a single act is as though he had taken retaliation for two eyes at once. On the strength of the same reasoning, those who say that, when retaliation is waived, the victim deserves the full diyyah reach their conclusion. Anyone committed to this position must, of necessity, deny retaliation altogether, whereas the scholar who allows retaliation and fixes the compensation at half the diyyah is more consistent with his underlying principle. Reflect on this, for it clarifies itself—and Allah knows best.

As for whether the injured party may choose between qiṣāṣ and taking the diyyah, or whether he has no right but qiṣāṣ unless the two parties reach a settlement, there are two opinions from Mālik, matching his two opinions in the case of homicide. Likewise, in one of Mālik’s two views concerning a one-eyed person who blinds the sound eye of someone with normal sight, the latter may choose either to blind the offender’s eye or to accept a diyyah of one thousand—or five hundred—dinars, according to the variant opinion.

With regard to the timing of retaliation for a wound: Mālik holds that it is not carried out until the wound has healed, whereas al-Shāfiʿī requires that it be carried out immediately, adhering to the apparent wording of the texts. Mālik, however, considers the likely outcome of the wound, fearing that immediate retaliation could lead to loss of life.

The scholars have differed about a case in which, after retaliation for a wound, the person against whom retaliation was taken dies from that very wound. Mālik, al-Shāfiʿī, Abū Yūsuf, and Muḥammad say that the avenger incurs no liability; the same is reported from ʿAlī and ʿUmar, and it is also the position of Aḥmad, Abū Thawr, and Dāwūd. Abū Ḥanīfah, al-Thawrī, Ibn Abī Laylā, and others hold that if he dies, the diyyah is owed by the avenger’s ʿāqilah; some maintain that it is payable from his own property. ʿUthmān al-Battī argues that the amount corresponding to the injury for which retaliation was taken should be deducted from the diyyah, and this is likewise reported from Ibn Masʿūd.

The first group’s chief evidence is their consensus that, if a thief dies after his hand has been severed, no liability falls on the one who carried out the amputation. Abū Ḥanīfah’s proof, by contrast, is that the case constitutes accidental killing and therefore requires the diyyah.

According to Mālik, retaliation is not carried out in times of extreme heat or severe cold; it is postponed lest the person from whom retaliation is taken should die. It has also been said that place itself is a condition for the permissibility of qiṣāṣ, meaning that it must be done outside the Sacred Precinct.

This concludes the rulings on deliberate offenses against life and limb. We now turn to the rulings for accidental offenses, beginning with accidental homicide.