As for a wound that destroys one of the victim’s limbs, the presence of deliberate intent is likewise a condition for retaliation (qiṣāṣ); on this there is no disagreement, though jurists do differ about how to distinguish what is intentional from what is not.

If the assailant strikes the very limb and severs it, using an instrument that normally severs limbs, or strikes in open hostility, there is unanimous agreement that retaliation is due.

However, should he strike with a slap, a whip, or the like—actions whose outward appearance gives no indication that he meant to destroy the limb—such as slapping a man and thereby blinding him, the majority classify this as quasi-intentional (shibh al-ʿamd). In that case no retaliation is carried out, but an aggravated diyyah is payable from the offender’s own wealth; this is the Iraqi transmission from Mālik. The well-known doctrine of the Mālikī school, nevertheless, is that such an act counts as intentional and therefore entails retaliation, except when the culprit is a father toward his son. Abū Ḥanīfah, Abū Yūsuf, and Muḥammad maintain that the category of quasi-intentional applies only to homicide, not to wounding.

If he wounds another in play and thereby destroys a limb, two opinions exist: one requires retaliation, the other does not. Under either view there is further disagreement about financial liability: some impose an aggravated diyyah, others the diyyah for accidental injury—that is, in cases where a diyyah is prescribed. The same dispute arises when the blow was inflicted as a form of discipline.

Whenever an intentional wound satisfies the conditions already mentioned, retaliation is required, for the Almighty says:

“For wounds there is retaliation” (Q 5:45).

This applies wherever retaliation is practicable, the corresponding member exists, and there is no fear that the victim’s life will be lost in carrying it out.

The jurists adopted this ruling because of the report:

“The Messenger of Allah—peace and blessings be upon him—waived retaliation in cases of maʾmūmah (a wound reaching the meninges), munaqqilah (a wound that displaces bone), and jāʾifah (a penetrating wound).”

Mālik and those who follow him held that the same rule pertains to every wound of similar nature that is destructive, such as breaking the bones of the neck, spine, chest, thigh, and the like.

Mālik’s own statements on the munaqqilah differ: at one time he required retaliation, at another he required the diyyah.

The same principle applies, according to Mālik, wherever exact equivalence in retaliation is impossible—such as seeking retribution for the loss of part of one’s sight or hearing. He also bars retaliation when no matching member exists, as when a blind person puts out the eye of one who can see.

There is a further disagreement about a one-eyed person who intentionally blinds the sound eye of someone with two eyes. The majority say that if the sound person wishes to retaliate he may do so. They differ, however, about the compensation should he waive retaliation: some hold that he is then entitled to the full diyyah of one thousand dinars—this is Mālik’s view—while others grant him only half the diyyah, a position taken by al-Shāfiʿī and likewise reported