As for implied expressions, they are of the sort a master might utter to his slave: “I have no claim over you,” or, “I no longer own you.” In such cases, say the majority, one looks to the master’s intention: did he mean thereby to set the slave free or not?

Among the points disputed in this chapter is the case of a master who addresses his slave with words of kinship, saying, for example, “My son,” or, “My father,” or, “My mother.” The majority hold that no manumission is entailed. Abū Ḥanīfah, however, rules that the slave is thereby emancipated, while the isolated opinion of Zufar goes further: were a master to say of his slave, “This is my son,” the slave would be freed—even if the slave were twenty years old and the master only thirty.

Another issue concerns the statement, “You are nothing but free.” Most jurists regard this as mere praise, not a declaration of emancipation; others, with al-Ḥasan al-Baṣrī among them, deem it a valid act of manumission.

Likewise, if a man calls one of his slaves by name and a different slave answers, whereupon the master says to that respondent, “You are free,” and then claims, “I meant the other one,” two opinions are reported: some say both slaves become free; others say the master’s stated intention is accepted.

The jurists unanimously agree that if a man frees what is in the womb of his slave-woman, the unborn child is liberated while the mother remains in bondage. They disagree, however, when the master emancipates the mother but expressly excludes the fetus: one group allows the exclusion, another says both mother and child are free.

They also differ over whether a manumission qualified by the phrase “if Allah wills” is effective. One party—Mālik among them—holds that such an exception is of no consequence, as in divorce. Another party maintains that the exception has legal force, again by analogy with divorce, as when someone says to his slave, “You are free, if Allah wills.”

Similarly, they dispute the validity of manumission conditioned upon future ownership. Mālik holds that it takes effect, whereas al-Shāfiʿī and others deny its validity, citing the Prophet’s words, peace and blessings be upon him, “There is no manumission of what the son of Adam does not own.” The opposing side likens the matter to an oath.

In general, the wording in this field resembles that of divorce: its conditions mirror those of divorce, and the same applies to the accompanying oaths.

As for the practical rulings, they are many. Among them: the majority hold that children follow their mother in freedom or slavery, though a minority except the case where the father is Arab. They also disagree about emancipation deferred to a future date. One group—including Mālik—says that, until the term arrives, the master of a female slave may neither have relations with her nor sell or gift her. Another group, represented by al-Awzāʿī and al-Shāfiʿī, allows all of that.

All agree that a master may stipulate a fixed period of service upon the freed person, either before or after manumission.

They differ when a master says to his slave, “If I sell you, you are free.” Some maintain that no manumission occurs, for once the slave is sold the seller no longer possesses the right to free him. Others—Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī among them—say that should he sell the slave, the latter is emancipated at the seller’s expense. The first view is that of Abū Ḥanīfah, his companions, and al-Thawrī. The subsidiary questions in this chapter are numerous, but what has been mentioned here suffices.