“Otherwise, only the portion he has set free is free.”

The discussion then turns on whether this sentence is the Prophet’s own statement—peace and blessings be upon him—or the words of Nāfiʿ, for the variant renderings of the report show inconsistency among its transmitters.

Among the reasons the Mālikīs deem the ḥadīth of Abū Hurayrah weak is that Qatādah’s pupils disagree with him over the clause that obliges the slave to work for his freedom.

From the standpoint of juristic reasoning, the Mālikīs argue that appraisal is required of the master only when he has sufficient means, because he is the one who has harmed his partner; the slave himself has caused no injury and therefore bears no liability.

The Kufan jurists, by contrast, reason that freedom is a divinely sanctioned right that may not be divided. Accordingly, if the emancipating partner is solvent the entire slave becomes free at his expense; if he is insolvent, the slave must work to pay his value. In this way the partner’s loss is remedied without imposing hardship on the slave. They also advance an analogical argument, saying:

Since the Sharīʿah recognises two kinds of manumission—a voluntary form, when a master frees his slave seeking Allah’s reward, and an involuntary form, when someone whom the Sharīʿah forbids a person to own automatically becomes free—so too should manumission by self-redemption (siʿāyah) exist in both modes. The voluntary counterpart of this is kitābah (a manumission contract); the involuntary counterpart is siʿāyah.

Mālik and al-Shāfiʿī—according to one of the latter’s two opinions—differ when the emancipator is solvent: does his partner’s share become free by judicial ruling (ḥukm) or through sarāyah, the automatic “spreading” of freedom? That is, does the obligation attach to him by the very act of manumission?

The Shāfiʿīs answer that it is freed by sarāyah, whereas the Mālikīs say it is freed only by a court judgment.

The Mālikīs reason that if sarāyah were operative it would apply whether the emancipator were solvent or insolvent. The Shāfiʿīs counter with what they see implied in the Prophet’s words—peace and blessings be upon him—“He shall be appraised at a fair market value.” They argue: liability for appraisal arises only after the property has been destroyed; by freeing his share the emancipator has, in effect, destroyed his partner’s right, so the valuation becomes due immediately, even if no judge has yet ruled. Consequently, the partner may no longer free his own share, for the manumission has already taken effect—this is clear.

Abū Ḥanīfah’s opinion in this matter runs counter to the apparent sense of both ḥadīths, and an anomalous dissent is reported. It is said that Ibn Sīrīn placed the partner’s share in the public treasury; that Rabīʿah regarded the manumission of one’s share in a slave as invalid; that some jurists exempt the insolvent emancipator from paying for the whole and allow freedom only in the part he freed; and that others oblige appraisal whether the emancipator is solvent or insolvent, with his partner following suit. In certain versions of Ibn ʿUmar’s ḥadīth the condition of solvency is omitted. All these views, however, conflict with the ḥadīths themselves—perhaps those reports never reached their proponents.

Mālik’s own statements diverge on a subsidiary question: if the emancipator is insolvent, should the judgment waiving appraisal be postponed until he attains solvency? Some say appraisal is then required, others say it is not.

Nonetheless, those who rely on these reports agree that anyone who, by choice, acquires a share in a slave whose ownership would necessitate his freedom thereby causes that slave to be set free.