It is also related from Jābir in yet another wording:

“Do not stipulate ʿumrā or ruqbā. Whoever is granted something as an ʿumrā or as a ruqbā, it belongs to his heirs.”

Abū al-Zubayr’s report from Jābir conflicts with the condition set by the donor (al-muʿmir). Mālik’s report from Jābir likewise runs contrary to that condition, though the clash appears less pronounced, for mentioning “offspring” gives the impression that the gift is meant to be irrevocable.

Accordingly, those who give priority to the ḥadīth over the donor’s stipulation adopt the narrations of Abū al-Zubayr and of Mālik from Jābir, whereas those who give priority to the condition follow Mālik’s legal opinion.

As for the position that an ʿumrā reverts to the donor if he did not mention the beneficiary’s offspring, and does not revert if he did mention them, it rests on the plain sense of the ḥadīth. The narration of Abū al-Zubayr from Jābir, however, is itself a matter of dispute—that is, Abū al-Zubayr’s transmission from Jābir.

If instead the donor uses the wording of residence (iskān) and says, “I lodge you in this house for as long as you live,” the majority hold that such lodging—or the grant of service (ikhdām)—differs from ʿumrā, even when the donor explicitly mentions offspring. Mālik, however, treats taʿmīr and iskān as identical. Al-Ḥasan, ʿAṭāʾ, and Qatādah likewise equated suknā (right of residence) with taʿmīr, maintaining—according to the majority view on ʿumrā—that neither term ever transfers ownership of the dwelling itself. The sound view is that iskān and taʿmīr convey the same concept, and that the ruling must differ when descendants are expressly mentioned from when they are not, just as the Ẓāhirīs have held.

Legal Rulings

One of the well-known questions in this chapter is the permissibility of iʿtiṣār in gifts—that is, retracting them. Mālik and the majority of the scholars of Madinah hold that a father may take back what he has given his son so long as the son has not married, incurred a debt, or, in general, so long as no third-party right has become attached to the gift. They also allow the mother to reclaim what she has given if the father is still alive, though another report from Mālik denies her that right.

Aḥmad and the Ẓāhirīs contend that no one may revoke a gift, while Abū Ḥanīfah rules that anyone may do so, except in the case of a gift to a maḥram relative whom one is permanently forbidden to marry. All agree that a gift intended as charity—that is, purely for the sake of God—may never be taken back.

The root of the disagreement here lies in the conflicting textual reports. Those who disallow iʿtiṣār altogether cite the general wording of the well-attested ḥadīth in which the Prophet—peace and blessings be upon him—said:

“The one who takes back his gift is like a dog that returns to its vomit.”